UIdaho Law

Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law
Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs

6-20-2012

State v. Wright Appellant's Brief Dckt. 39483

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/
idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs
Recommended Citation
"State v. Wright Appellant's Brief Dckt. 39483" (2012). Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs. 3864.
https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs/3864

This Court Document is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Idaho
Supreme Court Records & Briefs by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. For more information, please contact
annablaine@uidaho.edu.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

)

STATE OF IDAHO,

) Docket No. 39,~83-201l
Plaintiff,) Cas~ No. CR-2009-0025609
)
)

v.

\

RICHARD W. WRIGHT,

J

)

Defendant/Appellant, )

--------------------------------)

APPELLANT'S OPENING BRIEF

ATIORNEY FOR APPELLANT

ATfORN2:"f FOR I<.ESPONDE'lTS

Richard K. Kuck, ISB No. 3875
RICHARD K. KUCK, PLLC
408 Sherman Avenue, Suite 205
P.O. Box 1320
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83816-1329
(208) 667-3600
Fax: (208) 667-3379

Lawrence G Wasden
Jesska M. Lorello
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY
P.O. Box 83720
Boise, ID 83720-0010
(208) 334-2400
Fax: (20S) 8~i4-8U71

GB~mpAL

TABLE OF CONTENTS

TABLE OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES ........................... i
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

INTRODUCTION .............................................
STATEMENT OF FACTS .......................................
COURSE OF THE PROCEEDINGS ...............................
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL ...............................
STANDARDS OF REVIEW .....................................
ARGUMENT

1
1
2
5
5

I. The evidence at trial was insufficient for the trial court
to convict the Defendant of a violation of Idaho Code §
49-1301 .................................................. 6

A. Idaho Code § 49-1301 should not apply
to collisions between a vehicle and personal
property where the factors set forth in Idaho
Code § 49-1305 are not met ............................. 6
B. The State of Idaho failed to prove at trial
each essential element of the charged
violation ofIdaho Code § 49-1301 .....................

17

7. CONCLUSION ............................................... 19

TABLE OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES
1. STATUTES
a. Idaho Code § 49-1301
b. Idaho Code § 49-1302
c. Idaho Code § 49-1303
d. Idaho Code § 49-1304
e. Idaho Code § 49-1305
f. Idaho Code § 49-102(3)
2. CASE LAW
a. Standards of Review
l. Sufficiency of the Evidence

"Appellate review of the sufficiency of the evidence is limited in scope. A
finding of guilt will not be overturned on appeal where there is substantial
evidence upon which a reasonable trier of fact could have found that the
prosecution sustained its burden of proving the essential elements of a
crime beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Herrera-Brito, 131 Idaho 383,
385,957 P.2d 1099, 1101 (Ct.App.1998); State v. Knutson, 121 Idaho
101, 104,822 P.2d 998, 1001 (Ct.App.1991)."
State v. Stone, 147 Idaho 890, 216 P.3d 648 (Idaho App. 2009) (rev. denied Sept 25,
2009.)
"Due Process requires that the State prove every element of an
offense."
State v. Anderson, 144 Idaho 743, 750,170 P.3d 886 (Idaho 2007)
"The Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution
guarantees the right to due process, and the U.S. Supreme Court
has held that as a part of that due process, " no person shall be
made to suffer the onus of a criminal conviction except upon
sufficient proof-defined as evidence necessary to convince a trier
of fact beyond a reasonable doubt of the existence of every element
of the offense." Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 316, 99 S.Ct.
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2781,2787,61 L.Ed.2d 560,571 (1979). The relevant inquiry is
not whether this Court would find the defendant to be guilty
beyond a reasonable doubt, but whether" after viewing the
evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational
trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime
beyond a reasonable doubt." Id. at 319, 99 S.Ct. at 2789, 61
L.Ed.2d at 573 (emphasis in original)."
State v. Adamcik, 152 Idaho 445, 272 P.3d 417 (Idaho 2012).
ii. Statutory Interpretation

"The interpretation of a statute is a question of law over which we
exercise free review." McLean v. Maverik Country Stores, Inc., 142 Idaho
810, 813, 135 P.3d 756, 759 (2006). "This Court must construe a statute to
give effect to the intent of the legislature." Carrier v. Lake Pend Oreille
School Dist. # 84, 142 Idaho 804, 807, 134 P.3d 655,658 (2006). "It must
begin with the literal words of the statute; those words must be given their
plain, usual, and ordinary meaning; and the statute must be construed as a
whole." McLean v. Maverik Country Stores, Inc., 142 Idaho 810, 813, 135
P.3d 756, 759 (2006) (citations omitted). "Statutes that are in pari materia
must be construed together to effect legislative intent. Statutes are in pari
materia if they relate to the same subject." City of Sandpoint v. Sandpoint
Indep. Highway Dist., 139 Idaho 65, 69, 72 P.3d 905, 909 (2003)
(citations omitted)."
Paolini v. Alberston's. Inc., 143 Idaho 547, 149 P.3d 822,824 (Idaho 2006).

iii. Applicability of Idaho Code § 49-1301
"In the case before us, where the property damage caused by the
accident was to the front bumper of Swift's truck and to a runaway
horse, the applicability of the statute [I.C. § 49-1301] is not
obvious."
Munns v. Swift Transportation Company, 138 Idaho 108 (Idaho 2002).
"The inherent ambiguity in the statute precludes a conclusion that
Swift Transportation Co. Inc., and its driver were negligent as a
matter of law for violating the statute by not remaining at the scene
of the accident with the horse."
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Munns v. Swift Transportation Company, 138 Idaho 108 (Idaho 2002).
iv. The Rule of Lenity
"The rule of lenity states that criminal statutes must be strictly construed in favor
of defendants."
State v. Anderson, 145 Idaho 99, 103, 175 P.3d 788, 792 (Idaho 2008).
3. OTHER IDAHO AUTHORITY
a. Idaho Criminal Jury Instruction 1036
Icn 1036. LEAVING SCENE OF ACCIDENT - ATTENDED VEHICLE
INSTRUCTION NO. _ __
In order for the defendant to be guilty of Leaving the Scene of an Accident
[Involving an Attended Vehicle], the state must prove each of the following:
1. On or about [date],

2. in the state of Idaho,
3. the defendant [name] was driving a motor vehicle
4. on public or private property open to the public,
5. the defendant's vehicle was involved in an accident
6. which resulted in damage to another vehicle which was driven or attended by a
person,
7. the defendant had knowledge of the accident, and
8. either the defendant failed to immediately stop [his] [her] vehicle at the scene
of the accident, or to stop as close as possible and then immediately return to the
scene of the accident, or after stopping at or returning to the scene of the accident,
the defendant failed to remain at the scene until [he] [she] had done the following:
(a) given his or her name and address;
(b) given the name of his or her insurance agent or company, if the defendant had
automobile liability insurance;
(c) given the vehicle registration number of the vehicle the defendant was driving;
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and
(d) if available, exhibited [his] [her] driver's license to the driver of or person
attending the other vehicle involved in the collision.
If any of the above has not been proven beyond a reasonable doubt, you must find
the defendant not guilty. If each of the above has been proven beyond a
reasonable doubt, then you must find the defendant guilty.
Comment

I.e. §§ 49-1301 and 49-1302. Although the statute does not expressly require that
the defendant have knowledge of the accident, it is an essential element of the
offense. State v. Parish, 79 Idaho 75,310 P.2d 1082 (1957).
4. AUTHORITY FROM OTHER STATES
a. Foreign State Statutes
1. Colorado - eR.S. 42-4-1403

"The driver of any vehicle directly involved in an
accident resulting only in damage to a vehicle
which is driven or attended by any person shall
immediately stop such vehicle at the scene of such
accident or as close thereto as possible, but shall
forthwith return to and in every event shall remain
at the scene of such accident until he has fulfilled
the requirements of section 42-4-1403."

ii. Kansas - KS,A. 8-1603
"The driver of any vehicle involved in an accident
resulting only in damage to a vehicle or other
property which is driven or attended by any person
shall immediately stop such vehicle at the scene of
such accident, or as close thereto as possible, but
shall forthwith return to and in every event shall
remain at the scene of such accident until he or she
has fulfilled the requirements ofK.S.A. 8-1604."
[Emphasis added]

iii. Iowa - Iowa Code § 321.261
l. The driver of any vehicle involved in an accident
resulting in injury to or death of any person shall
immediately stop the vehicle at the scene of the
accident or as close as possible and if able, shall
then return to and remain at the scene of the
accident in accordance with section 32l.263. Every
such stop shall be made without obstructing traffic
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more than is necessary.
2. Any person failing to stop or to comply with the
requirements in subsection 1 of this section, in the
event of an accident resulting in an injury to any
person is guilty upon conviction of a serious
misdemeanor. "
b. Foreign State Case Law

I. Lumbardy v. Colorado, 625 P.2d. 1026, 1027 (Colo. 1981).
"Section 42-4-1402 plainly applies to an accident
involving injury to someone other than the driver or
damage to two or more vehicles. The statute
contemplates a situation where there are other
persons to whom the driver should report
information about himself."

***
"The county court, in determining that section
42-4-1402 applied to the facts in this case,
interpreted "any person" in the first sentence of the
statute to refer back to "the driver." So construed,
"accident," as used in the statute, would include all
one car accidents since the driver and "any person"
would be one and the same individual.
The district court affirmed the county court's
interpretation of "any person." It also interpreted the
emphasized "and" in section 42-4-1403(2), p. 3,
supra, as an "or" in order to make section 42-4-1403
logically applicable to single vehicle accidents.
The defendant argues that the duties of a driver
involved in a one car accident are prescribed by
section 42-4-1406, C.R.S.1973:
"(1) The driver of a vehicle involved in a traffic
accident resulting in injury to or death of any person
or any property damage shall, after fulfilling the
requirements of section 42-4-1402 and
42-4-1403(1), give immediate notice of the location
of such accident and such other information as is
specified in section 42-4-1403(2) to the nearest
office of the duly authorized police authority and, if
so directed by the police authority, shall forthwith
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and without delay return to and remain at the scene
of the accident until said police have arrived at the
scene and completed their investigation thereat."
We agree. Section 42-4-1406(1) unequivocally
applies to a single car accident. Apparently, the
county court and the district court overlooked or
ignored section 42-4-1406. Instead, they found it
necessary to stretch the terms of section 42-4-1402
to "reasonably effect the legislative intent evidenced
by the entire statutory scheme." The duty to report a
single car accident under section 42-4-1406 is
included within the leaving the scene of the accident
Chit and run") statutory scheme. Gammon v. State
Dept. of Revenue, 32 Colo.App. 437,513 P.2d 748
(1973). Therefore, section 42-4-1406, rather than
section 42-4-1402, as interpreted by the two lower
courts, is the provision requiring a driver to report
property damage in a single car accident. The facts
of this case do not support the defendant's
conviction under section 42-4-1402.
We reverse and remand to the district court with
directions to vacate the defendant's conviction.
ii. State v. Holm, 41 Kan.App.2d 1096, 1100,208 P.3d. 325, 328

(Kan.App. 2009).
"A reading of these statutes appears to require
remaining at the scene of a noninjury accident only
if the property damaged by the damaging driver is
attended by another person. Therefore a single car
accident does not require remaining at the scene
unless the property the property of some other
person is damaged."
iii. State v. Tarbox, 739 N.W.2d 850 (Iowa 2007)

"In his petition for further review Christopher
Jerome Tarbox asks this court to reverse the court of
appeals decision finding the district court erred
when it dismissed the trial information charging
him with leaving the scene of an accident in
violation oflowa Code section 321.261 (2003).
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Tarbox claims because he was involved in a
single-vehicle accident, and he was the only person
who suffered a personal injury, his conduct did not
violate section 321.261. Accepting the facts alleged
by the State in the trial information and minutes as
true, we agree with Tarbox that his conduct of
leaving the scene of the single-vehicle accident did
not violate section 321.261. Accordingly, we vacate
the decision of the court of appeals and affirm the
decision of the district court."
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INTRODUCTION
This appeal stems from the conviction following a court trial of the Defendant, Richard
William Wright, of a violation of Idaho Code § 49-1301 arising from a single vehicle accident
involving only the Defendant's vehicle and a speed limit sign which was located adjacent to a
public road.
The Defendant appeared pro-se at trial.
The question presented to the Court is whether Idaho Code § 49-l301 is violated if a
driver fails to remain at the scene of an accident involving damage only to his own vehicle and to
the personal property of another.
There was no evidence presented at trial by either party as to the monetary value of the
damage either to Wright's vehicle nor to the street sign, but the fair inference from the evidence
is that Wright's vehicle slid off a public road on ice as he drove to work at about 7:55, a.m.; that
a speed limit sign was knocked down, that the damage to Wright's vehicle was limited to plastic
door molding.
In a case titled Munns v. Swift Transportation, Inc., cited at 138 Idaho 108,58. P.3d 92,
95 (Idaho 2002), this Court questioned the applicability of Idaho Code § 49-1301 to a highway
collision between a tractor-trailer and a horse. This appeal provides an opportunity to further
address that question.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
A summary of the facts underlying the criminal misdemeanor citation would be that on
December 18,2009, at about 7:55 a.m., the Defendant/Appellant, Richard W. Wright, was
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driving his Black 1996 Jeep on Nita Street near its intersection with Government Way, in
Hayden, Kootenai County, Idaho.
The road conditions were very icy and Mr. Wright's Jeep slid off of the road on the ice
and knocked over a speed limit sign. Mr. Wright's Jeep sustained some damage to plastic door
molding. Mr. Wright drove his vehicle back onto the roadway and continued to his business, a
cafe called 'City Perc,' in downtown Coeur d' Alene, Idaho.
A motorist observed the event and called '911' to provide a description of the event and
of the vehicle involved. A police officer drove to Mr. Wright's residence and talked with Mr.
Wright's wife, who called Mr. Wright at his business. The officer asked to speak with Mr.
Wright and Mr. Wright advised the officer that his vehicle slid off of Nita Street, knocked over a
street sign and that he had intended to report the accident on a 'self-report form.'
The officer then drove to Mr. Wright's business and after some discussion in which the
officer believed Mr. Wright's answers were somewhat evasive, he cited Mr. Wright with a
violation ofIdaho Code § 49-1301.
COURSE OF THE PROCEEDINGS
Mr. Wright pleaded not guilty to the misdemeanor citation and on March 1,2010 a court
trial was held before the Honorable Penny Friedlander, Magistrate Judge. Mr. Wright appeared
pro-se.
After the parties and the Court wrangled through an issue regarding the State's failure to
provide a response to the Defendant's written request for discovery, the State called four
witnesses, Mr. Donald Blanchard and Mr. Timothy DeWitt, the driver and a passenger of a car
who observed the incident, and Kootenai County Deputies Joshua Leyk and Patrick Meehan.
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Mr. Blanchard testified generally that he observed a black jeep slide on ice over a curb
and knock down a 'standard street sign' which said '25 miles an hour' on it (Tr. pp. 9-10). Mr.
Blanchard testified that following the collision with the street sign the Jeep 'continued back out'
and turned southbound on Wayne (Tr. p. 10, II. 2-4). Mr. DeWitt did not testify regarding his
actual observations of the incident (See Generally Tr. p. 17, II. 13-24). Deputy Meehan testified
that after he received a report of the incident, including the license plate, he drove to the scene
and observed a speed limit sign broken up at the base and on the ground and that he also
observed part of a 'covering that goes over the side of a vehicle to protect it from door dings'
lying on the ground (Tr. pp. 23-34.).
Deputy Leyk testified that after the report of the collision he drove to the Defendant's
home and spoke with his wife and told her that the Defendant had been involved in an accident
(Tr. p. 33). Deputy Leyk testified that Mrs. Wright called Mr. Wright and overheard the
conversation in which Mr. Wright told Mrs. Wright that he had slid on ice, hit a traffic sign and
knocked it down, but that he was "fine and not hurt" (Tr. pp. 34-35).
Deputy Leyk then spoke with the individual he believed was Mr. Wright and that during
that conversation Mr. Wright had told him he had "slipped on the ice on Government and
knocked over a traffic sign and that "he had intended to report the accident to law enforcement
through ... a self-report form." (Tr. p. 36, II. 15-23). Mr. Wright explained to Deputy Leyk that he
was former law enforcement and that was the process he was familiar with as far as reporting an
accident (Tr. P. 36, 11. 23-25).
Deputy Leyk then erroneously advised Mr. Wright that "per Idaho Code, he's required to
immediately notify law enforcement of any accident" (Tr. pp. 36-37).
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In closing the State's theory was that Mr. Wright was guilty of the offense charged
because he had not reported the collision to law enforcement (Tr. p. 51, 11. 14-22).
The State introduced no evidence of the ownership of the street sign, no evidence of the
value of the damage done to the street sign and no evidence of the value of the damage done to
Mr. Wright's vehicle.
The record is also entirely devoid of any evidence from either party regarding whether or
not the accident had been reported to the owner of the sign.
Following trial the court convicted Mr. Wright of a violation of Idaho Code § 49-1301
(Tr. p. 57, 11. 9-10).
Mr. Wright timely appealed to the District Court and on May 11, 2011, through a written
"Memorandum Decision and Order on Appeal," the District Court, Hon. John T. Mitchell, denied
the appeal.
Mr. Wright timely petitioned the District Court for a re-hearing and on October 11,2011
the District Court denied the petition for rehearing.
On November 23,2011, Mr. Wright timely filed this appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court. 1

IMr. Wright'S intermediate appeal to the District Court included issues related to whether
or not he had been denied his right to counsel at the time of the sentencing in this matter. For the
reason that on March 13,2012 the underlying Idaho Code § 49-1301 conviction has been
dismissed following Mr. Wright's successful completion of the withheld judgment imposed in
this matter, those issues are not pursued by Mr. Wright through this appeal.
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ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
I. Whether the evidence at trial was insufficient for the trial court to convict the
Defendant of a violation ofIdaho Code § 49-l301

A. Idaho Code § 49-l301 should not apply to collisions between a
vehicle and personal property where the factors set forth in Idaho
Code § 49-1305 are not met.

B. The State of Idaho failed to prove each essential element of the
charged violation ofIdaho Code § 49-l301 at trial.
STANDARDS OF REVIEW
This Court has provided clear standards for the review of issues such as those presented
by this appeal. Segregated into categories, the applicable standards of review appear to be as
follows:
1. Sufficiency of the Evidence for Conviction.
Appellate review of the sufficiency of the evidence is limited in scope. A finding
of guilt will not be overturned on appeal where there is substantial evidence upon
which a reasonable trier of fact could have found that the prosecution sustained its
burden of proving the essential elements of a crime beyond a reasonable doubt.
State v. Herrera-Brito, l31 Idaho 383, 385, 957 P.2d 1099, 1101 (Ct.App.1998);
State v. Knutson, 121 Idaho 101, 104,822 P.2d 998, 1001 (CLApp. 1991).
State v. Stone, 147 Idaho 890, 216 P.3d 648 (Idaho App. 2009) (rev. denied Sept 25,2009.)
"The Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution guarantees the
right to due process, and the U.S. Supreme Court has held that as a part of that
due process, " no person shall be made to suffer the onus of a criminal conviction
except upon sufficient proof-defined as evidence necessary to convince a trier of
fact beyond a reasonable doubt of the existence of every element of the offense."
Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307,316,99 S.Ct. 2781, 2787, 61 L.Ed.2d 560,571
(1979). The relevant inquiry is not whether this Court would find the defendant to
be guilty beyond a reasonable doUbt, but whether" after viewing the evidence in
the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have
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found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt." Id. at 319,
99 S.Ct. at 2789, 61 L.Ed.2d at 573 (emphasis in original)."
State v. Adamcik, 152 Idaho 445, 272 P.3d 417 (Idaho 2012).
2. Statutory Interpretation
"The interpretation of a statute is a question of law over which we exercise free
review." McLean v. Maverik Country Stores, Inc., 142 Idaho 810, 813, 135 P.3d
756, 759 (2006). "This Court must construe a statute to give effect to the intent of
the legislature." Carrier v. Lake Pend Oreille School Dist. # 84, 142 Idaho 804,
807, 134 P.3d 655,658 (2006). "It must begin with the literal words of the statute;
those words must be given their plain, usual, and ordinary meaning; and the
statute must be construed as a whole." McLean v. Maverik Country Stores, Inc.,
142 Idaho 810, 813, 135 P.3d 756, 759 (2006) (citations omitted). "Statutes that
are in pari materia must be construed together to effect legislative intent. Statutes
are in pari materia if they relate to the same subject." City of Sandpoint v.
Sandpoint Indep. Highway Dist., 139 Idaho 65, 69, 72 P.3d 905,909 (2003)
(citations omitted).
Paolini v. Alberston's, Inc., 143 Idaho 547,149 P.3d 822,824 (Idaho 2006).
ARGUMENT
I. The evidence at trial was insufficient for the trial court to convict the Defendant
of a violation of Idaho Code § 49-1301

A. Idaho Code § 49-1301 should not apply to collisions between a
vehicle and personal property where the factors set forth in Idaho
Code § 49-1305 are not met.
The interpretation of a statute is a question over which this Court exercises free review,
State v. Maidwell, 137 Idaho 424, 426, 50 P.3d 439,441 (2002) (citing Lopez v. State, 136 Idaho
174,30 P.3d 952 (2001)).
The Rule of Lenity requires that criminal statutes be strictly construed to favor
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defendants in criminal matters, State v. Anderson, 145 Idaho 99, 103, 175 P.3d 788 (Idaho
2008).
In its 2002 decision in Munns v. Swift Transportation Co. Inc., cited at 138 Idaho 108,58
P.3d 92, this Court has commented upon what it termed "the inherent ambiguity" of Idaho Code
§ 49-1301:

"Idaho Code section 49-1301(1) directs the driver of any vehicle
involved in an accident to immediately stop and to remain at the
scene until he has fulfilled the requirements of law. The statute
prescribes the duty owed by the drivers in an accident to each
other, presumably to allow information gathering concerning the
accident. However, the statute qualifies "an accident" by limiting it
to one "resulting in only damage to a vehicle which is driven or
attended by a person." In the case before us, where the property
damage caused by the accident was to the front bumper of Swift's
truck and to a runaway horse, the applicability of the statute is not
obvious. The inherent ambiguity in the statute precludes a
conclusion that Swift Transportation Co., Inc., and its driver were
negligent as a matter of law for violating the statute by not
remaining at the scene of the accident with the horse."
Munns v. Swift Transportation Co. Inc., supra., at 138 Idaho at 111.
The evidence the State produced at Mr. Wright's trial was that Mr. Wright's vehicle had
left the roadway after sliding on ice, knocked over a speed limit sign, suffered un-quantified
damage to plastic door molding and that Mr. Wright failed to immediately report the accident to
law enforcement.
The State's theory at trial seems to have attempted to intertwine the duties required of
drivers involved in accidents under Idaho Code § 49-1305, with the statutory phrase "until he has
fulfilled the requirements of law" as used in Idaho Code § 49-1301(1).
The issues presented by Mr. Wright in this appeal also appear to necessarily intertwine:
APPELLANT'S OPENING BRIEF ON APPEAL - 7

1) whether Idaho Code § 49-1301 can have legal application under the facts of this case, and 2) if
so, whether the evidence presented at this trial was sufficient to sustain the Defendant's
conviction of violating that statute.
To evaluate Mr. Wright's argument the language of Idaho Code § 49-1301 is a starting
point. That statute reads in its entirety as follows:
§ 49-1301. ACCIDENTS INVOLVING DAMAGE TO VEHICLE
(1) The driver of any vehicle involved in an accident, either on

public or private property open to the public, resulting only in
damage to a vehicle which is driven or attended by any person
shall immediately stop the vehicle at the scene of the accident, or
as close as possible, and shall immediately return to, and in every
event shall remain at, the scene of the accident until he has fulfilled
the requirements of law.
(2) For any accident which occurs on a divided, controlled-access
highway or interstate highway of the state highway system, a stop
as required by subsection (1) of this section shall be made by
moving the vehicle into a safe refuge on the shoulder, emergency
lane or median whenever such moving of a vehicle may be done
safely and the vehicle is capable of being normally and safely
driven, does not require towing, and may be operated under its own
power in its customary manner without further damage or hazard to
itself, to the traffic elements or to the roadway.
(a) For any other highway, a stop as required by subsection (1) of
this section shall be made without obstructing traffic more than is
necessary.
(b) The dri ver or any other person who has removed a motor
vehicle from the main-traveled part of the road as provided in this
subsection before the arrival of a law enforcement officer shall not
be considered liable or at fault regarding the cause of the accident
solely by reason of moving the vehicle pursuant to this subsection.
(3) Any person failing to stop or to comply with the requirements
under these circumstances shall be guilty of a misdemeanor.
(4) The department shall revoke for a period of one (1) year the
driver's license, privileges or permit to drive, or the nonresident
operating privilege, of any person convicted of a violation of the
provisions of subsection (1) of this section.
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(5) Nothing herein shall be construed to interfere with the duty of
any city, county or state police officer to investigate and detect
crime and enforce the penal, traffic or highway laws of this state or
any political subdivision.
The facts of this case seem to much more involve the application of Idaho Code § 49-1304,
which expressly pertains to accidents involving vehicles and fixtures. Idaho Code § 49-1304
reads as follows:
§ 49-1304. DUTY UPON STRIKING FIXTURES UPON OR
ADJACENT TO A HIGHWAY

The driver of any vehicle involved in an accident resulting in damage to fixtures
or other property legally upon or adjacent to a highway shall take reasonable steps
to locate and notify the owner or person in charge of the property of the fact, of
his name and address, the name of his insurance agent or company if he has
automobile liability insurance, the motor vehicle registration number of the
vehicle he is driving, and upon request and if available exhibit his driver's license.
Idaho Code § 49-1304 does not require that an involved driver remain at the scene of an accident
with a fixture or other property. Idaho Code §§ 49-1301 and 49-1304 clearly describe two
distinctly separate crimes. Idaho Code § 49-1301 expressly applies to an accident involving
damage to a vehicle dri ven or attended by any person, while Idaho Code § 49-1304 applies only
to an accident resulting in damage to fixtures or property.
Further, Idaho Code § 49-1301 expressly limits its application to accidents "resulting
only in damage to a vehicle which is driven or attended by any person." What statute applies if
an accident results in damage to a vehicle, but also results in damage to fixtures or property? Or
does the driver have separate duties in an accident that involves damage to a vehicle and also to
fixtures or property? Add in the legislative definition of 'accident' and the duties of a driver
involved in an accident become even more complicated.
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Idaho Code § 49-102(3) defines the term 'accident':
"Accident" means any event that results in an unintended injury or
property damage attributable directly or indirectly to the motion of
a motor vehicle or its load, a snowmobile or special mobile
equipment."
The statutory term "accident" clearly encompasses such events as a rock or other debris
being propelled onto vehicle either by its own motion or by the motion of another vehicle.
Could Idaho Code § 49-1301 have been intended by the legislature to require a driver to
stop and return to the scene of a windshield rock chip? Clearly some rule of reason must apply.
The legislature's statutory scheme as previously limited by this Court works only ifIdaho
Code §49-1301 applies only to accidents involving a vehicle driven or attended by someone
other than the defendant driver. With that limitation, drivers duties become clear under multiple
scenarios:
If a driver is involved in an accident resulting only in damage to another vehicle driven or

attended by any person, then that driver must immediately stop the vehicle at the scene of the
accident, or as close as possible, and shall immediately return to, and in every event shall remain
at, the scene of the accident until he has fulfilled the requirements ofIdaho Code § 49-1302. In
other words, Idaho Code § 49-1302 describes the duties required of a driver who strikes an
attended vehicle within the contemplation ofIdaho Code § 49-1301.
Idaho Code §§ 49-1303 and 49-1304 are not part of that statutory scheme. They stand
alone and apart. Idaho Code §§ 49-1301 and 49-1302 require the presence of another driver or
person attending the struck vehicle to give information to.
Idaho Code § 49-1303 contains independent language requiring that the driver of a
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vehicle which strikes an unattended vehicle, stop and "then and there" either locate and provide
specific information the operator or owner of the unattended vehicle.
Notably, Idaho Code § 49-1304 does not require the driver of a vehicle striking a fixture
or other property located on or adjacent to the highway to stop at the scene, but rather requires
only that a driver involved in an accident resulting in damage to fixtures or other property legally
upon or adjacent to a highway shall take reasonable steps to locate and notify the owner or
person in charge of the property of the fact and provide specific identifying information.
For that reason, Mr. Wright had no duty to stop or return to the scene of the accident in
question in this case as a consequence of damaging someone else's property. The question
becomes whether he had a duty to stop and return to the scene of the accident because his own
vehicle suffered minor damage.
Idaho Code § 49-1305 defines the circumstances under which an accident must be
reported to law enforcement:
§ 49-1305. IMMEDIATE NOTICE OF ACCIDENTS
(1) The driver of a vehicle involved in an accident resulting in

injury to or death of any person, or damage to the property of any
one (1) person in excess of one thousand five hundred dollars
($1,500) shall immediately, by the quickest means of
communication, give notice of the accident to the local police
department if the accident occurs within a city, otherwise to the
office of the county sheriff or the nearest office of the state police.
(2) Whenever the driver of a vehicle is physically incapable of
giving immediate notice of an accident as required herein, and
there was another occupant in the vehicle at the time of the
accident capable of doing so, the occupant shall give or cause to be
given the notice not given by the driver.
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In this case, there was no evidence presented at trial by the State, or by Mr. Wright, of the
monetary value of the damage to Mr. Wright's vehicle or of the monetary value of the damage to
the speed limit sign. The only evidence that related to the issue of whether any person was
injured was testimony by a witness named Blanchard who testified that " ... there was no bodily
injury or threat to anybody" (Tr. p. 12, II. 16-17.), and testimony by Deputy Leyk that Mr.
Wright had told him that "he (Wright) was fine, that he was not hurt." (Tr. p. 35, 11. 1-2). The
trial court made no findings in that regard. For those reasons the accident was not one that was
required to be immediately, or otherwise, reported to law enforcement.

If the statutory phrase" until he has fulfilled the requirements of law" from Idaho Code §
49-1301(1) is considered to include the reporting duty described by Idaho Code § 49-1305, that
section also has no application to Mr. Wright's case.
Thus, the only possible way that Idaho Code § 49-1301 could have application to Mr.
Wright's situation is if damage to his own vehicle could trigger the duty to stop at, or return to,
the scene of the accident and remain there.
The analysis of this Court in Munns, supra., is persuasive on that issue. The purpose of
the 'stop and remain' provisions Idaho Code §§ 49-1301 and 49-1302 is to require that
identifying and insurance information be provided to each driver or other person attending a
vehicle involved in a collision. That policy is not advanced by requiring the driver of a vehicle
involved in a single vehicle collision to remain at the scene of the collision. Given a hypothetical
where an accident occurs between a vehicle and a natural rock wall bordering a roadway, where
the single vehicle involved sustains damage and the natural rock wall sustains none, what could
be the policy advanced by requiring that driver to remain at the scene of that accident?
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Construing nearly identical language to that ofIdaho Code § 49-1301, appellate courts from
other jurisdictions have concluded that the statutory language "any vehicle directly involved in
an accident resulting only in damage to a vehicle which is driven or attended by any person"
does not apply to describe the defendant driver's own vehicle.
For example, the Colorado Supreme Court examined the statutory language of Colorado's
similar statute, c.R.S. 42-4-1403, which states:
"The driver of any vehicle directly involved in an accident resulting only in
damage to a vehicle which is driven or attended by any person shall immediately
stop such vehicle at the scene of such accident or as close thereto as possible, but
shall forthwith return to and in every event shall remain at the scene of such
accident until he has fulfilled the requirements of section 42-4-1403."
Lumbardy v. Colorado, 625 P.2d. 1026, 1027 (Colo. 1981). Construing that language the
Colorado Supreme Court held:
Section 42-4-1402 plainly applies to an accident involving injury to someone
other than the driver or damage to two or more vehicles. The statute contemplates
a situation where there are other persons to whom the driver should report
information about himself.
The Colorado Supreme Court reasoned that the lower courts had stretched the application of
c.R.S. 42-4-1402 too far to try to gi ve it application to a single vehicle collision:
The county court, in determining that section 42-4-1402 applied to the facts in this
case, interpreted "any person" in the first sentence of the statute to refer back to
"the driver." So construed, "accident," as used in the statute, would include all one
car accidents since the driver and "any person" would be one and the same
indi vidual.
The district court affirmed the county court's interpretation of "any person." It also
interpreted the emphasized "and" in section 42-4-1403(2), p. 3, supra, as an "or"
in order to make section 42-4-1403 logically applicable to single vehicle
accidents.
The defendant argues that the duties of a driver involved in a one car accident are
prescribed by section 42-4-1406, C.R.S.1973:
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"(1) The driver of a vehicle involved in a traffic accident resulting in injury to or
death of any person or any property damage shall, after fulfilling the requirements
of section 42-4-1402 and 42-4-1403(1), give immediate notice of the location of
such accident and such other information as is specified in section 42-4-1403(2) to
the nearest office of the duly authorized police authority and, if so directed by the
police authority, shall forthwith and without delay return to and remain at the
scene of the accident until said police have arrived at the scene and completed
their investigation thereat." We agree.
Section 42-4-1406(1) unequivocally applies to a single car accident. Apparently,
the county court and the district court overlooked or ignored section 42-4-1406.
Instead, they found it necessary to stretch the terms of section 42-4-1402 to
"reasonably effect the legislative intent evidenced by the entire statutory scheme."
The duty to report a single car accident under section 42-4-1406 is included
within the leaving the scene of the accident ("hit and run") statutory scheme.
Gammon v. State Dept. of Revenue, 32 Colo.App. 437, 513 P.2d 748 (1973).
Therefore, section 42-4-1406, rather than section 42-4-1402, as interpreted by the
two lower courts, is the provision requiring a driver to report property damage in a
single car accident. The facts of this case do not support the defendant's
conviction under section 42-4-1402.
We reverse and remand to the district court with directions to vacate the
defendant's conviction.
Likewise, the Court of Appeals of Kansas has construed language in its Leaving the
Scene of an Accident statute to require the involvement of at least two (2) vehicles. In that case,
State v. Holm, 41 Kan.App.2d 1096, 208 P.3d 325 (Kan.App. 2009) the court was construing
K.S,A. 8-1603, which reads in the pertinent part:
"The driver of any vehicle involved in an accident resulting only in damage to a
vehicle or other property which is driven or attended by any person shall
immediately stop such vehicle at the scene of such accident, or as close thereto as
possible, but shall forthwith return to and in every event shall remain at the scene
of such accident until he or she has fulfilled the requirements of K.S.A. 8-1604."
The Kansas statute is substantially identical to Idaho Code § 49-1301 with the exception that it
expressly applies when there is damage only to a "vehicle or to other property." Idaho Code
Section 49-1301 omits any reference to 'other property' and expressly applies only to accidents
resulting only in damage to a vehicle. Like the Colorado Supreme Court, the Kansas Court of
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Appeals held that:
A reading of these statutes appears to require remaining at the scene of a
noninjury accident only if the property damaged by the damaging driver is
attended by another person. Therefore a single car accident does not require
remaining at the scene unless the property the property of some other person is
damaged."
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State v. Holm, 41 Kan.App.2d 1096, 1100,208 P.3d. 325, 328 (Kan.App. 2009).
It is critical to recall that the Kansas statute expressly applies to collisions involving
damage to 'personal property' rather than only to damage to vehicles. Idaho Code § 49-1301
expressly applies to accidents involving only damage to a vehicle.
The Supreme Court of Iowa has also interpreted similar statutory language as having no
application to single vehicle accidents. In State v. Tarbox, 739 N.W.2d 850 (Iowa 2007) the
Supreme Court of Iowa wrestled with a similar issue. In that case Tarbox crashed his car into a
concrete wall, suffered a personal injury and fled the area. Tarbox was charged with a violation
ofIowa Code § 32l.261 which provides:
"§ 32l.26l. Death or personal injuries

1. The driver of any vehicle involved in an accident resulting in injury to or death
of any person shall immediately stop the vehicle at the scene of the accident or as
close as possible and if able, shall then return to and remain at the scene of the
accident in accordance with section 321.263. Every such stop shall be made
without obstructing traffic more than is necessary.
2. Any person failing to stop or to comply with the requirements in subsection 1
of this section, in the event of an accident resulting in an injury to any person is
guilty upon conviction of a serious misdemeanor."
The Supreme Court of Iowa ruled that the statutory language 'accident resulting in injury to, or
death of any person' does not apply to the driver of a vehicle involved in a single-vehicle
collision:
"In his petition for further review Christopher Jerome Tarbox asks this court to
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reverse the court of appeals decision finding the district court erred when it
dismissed the trial information charging him with leaving the scene of an accident
in violation ofIowa Code section 321.261 (2003). Tarbox claims because he was
involved in a single-vehicle accident, and he was the only person who suffered a
personal injury, his conduct did not violate section 321.261. Accepting the facts
alleged by the State in the trial information and minutes as true, we agree with
Tarbox that his conduct of leaving the scene of the single-vehicle accident did not
violate section 321.261. Accordingly, we vacate the decision of the court of
appeals and affirm the decision of the district court. "
The Colorado, Kansas and Iowa decisions seem to line up very well with the language
adopted for Idaho Criminal Jury Instruction 1036, which is to be given when a Defendant is tried
by a jury for a violation of either Idaho Code § 49-1301 orIdaho Code § 49-1302. That
instruction reads as follows:
Icn 1036 LEA VING SCENE OF ACCIDENT - ATTENDED VEillCLE
INSTRUCTION NO. _ _
In order for the defendant to be guilty of Leaving the Scene of an Accident [Involving an
Attended Vehicle], the state must prove each of the following:
1. On or about [date],
2. in the state of Idaho,
3. the defendant [name] was driving a motor vehicle
4. on public or private property open to the public,
5. the defendant's vehicle was involved in an accident
6. which resulted in damage to another vehicle which was driven or attended by a person,
7. the defendant had knowledge of the accident, and
8. either the defendant failed to immediately stop [his] [her] vehicle at the scene of the
accident, or to stop as close as possible and then immediately return to the scene of the accident,
or after stopping at or returning to the scene of the accident, the defendant failed to remain at the
scene until [he] [she] had done the following:
(a) given his or her name and address;
(b) given the name of his or her insurance agent or company, if the defendant had
automobile liability insurance;
(c) given the vehicle registration number of the vehicle the defendant was driving; and
(d) if available, exhibited [his] [her] driver's license to the driver of or person attending
the other vehicle involved in the collision.
If any of the above has not been proven beyond a reasonable doubt, you must find the
defendant not guilty. If each of the above has been proven beyond a reasonable doubt, then you
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must find the defendant gUilty."
Icn 1306. Icn 1036 contains the express requirement that in order to convict a defendant of a
violation ofldaho Code § 49-1301 or § 49-1302 that the State must prove that the defendant's
vehicle was involved in an accident which resulted in damage to another vehicle which was
driven or attended by a person.
B. The State of Idaho failed to prove at trial each essential element of the charged
violation of Idaho Code § 49-1301.
The essential elements of a violation ofIdaho Code § 49-1301 according to the plain
language of the statute are as follows:
l.The driver of any vehicle involved in an accident,
2. either on public or private property open to the public,
3. resulting only in damage to a vehicle,
4. which is driven or attended by any person,
5. shall immediately stop the vehicle at the scene of the accident, or as close as possible,
and,
6. shall immediately return to, and in every event shall remain at, the scene of the
accident until he has fulfilled the requirements of law.
Aside from the idea expressed above that Idaho Code § 49-1301simply does not apply to
single vehicle collisions with personal property, to prove a violation ofldaho Code § 49-1301,
the State must prove each of the elements of that statute.
In this case the record is entirely devoid of any evidence that the street sign was either on
public property or on private property open to the pUblic.
The record of this case is also conclusive that the accident in issue did not result in
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damage only to a vehicle.
Idaho Code § 49-1302 is illustrative as to whether the statutory phrase" an accident
resulting in damage to any vehicle which is driven or attended by any person" refers to the driver
involved in a single vehicle accident, or only to an accident involving at least a second vehicle.
Again, Idaho Code § 49-1302 provides in the relevant portion:
9-1302. DUTY TO GIVE INFORMATION IN ACCIDENT INVOLVING
DAMAGE TO A VEillCLE
(1) The driver of any vehicle involved in an accident resulting in damage to any

vehicle which is driven or attended by any person shall, at the scene of the
accident, give his name, address and, if available, at the scene of the accident, he
shall exhibit his driver's license, proof of registration and certificate or proof of
liability insurance to the person struck or to the driver or person attending any
vehicle collided with.
Construed together with Idaho Code § 49-1302, it is clear that the statutory language of Idaho
Code § 49-1301 referring to "the driver of any vehicle involved in an accident resulting in
damage to any vehicle which is driven or attended by any person" refers not to a driver involved
in a single vehicle collision with personal property, but rather only to a driver of a second vehicle
involved in the collision. The language ofldaho Code §§ 49-1301 and 49-1302 are identical in
that regard, and the identical language in Idaho Code § 49-1302 clearly is restricted only to the
driver of a second or other vehicle involved in the accident.
Finally, because the State failed to produce any evidence that the street sign was owned
or the property of any person or entity, or was on public property or private property open to the
public, even if Idaho Code § 49-1301 has any legal application to the facts of this case, no
rational trier-of-fact could have concluded that the State had proved that Mr. Wright had any
legal duty to remain at the scene of the accident.
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CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, the conviction of the Defendant, Richard W. Wright, for a
violation ofIdaho Code § 49-1301 should be set aside and the charge against him dismissed.
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